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I. Introduction
In the United States, the philosophical direction of securities laws in the twentieth cen-
tury has moved away from the rule of caveat emptor towards a requirement of full disclosure,I
based on the economic premise that complete and timely information makes capital markets
efficient.2 Since the nineteenth century, France has shifted away from the rule of caveat
emptor in securities or financial transactions as well, but the tendency of French regulation
has been towards moralistic rules that restrict or prohibit transactions where there is a
perception of unequal bargaining power. Despite recent regulatory reforms, French secu-
rities laws are intertwined with antique consumer protection laws that remain applicable,
apparently by historical accident, to financial transactions where there is no fragile con-
sumer to protect. Such rules often outrightly contradict permissive exemptions created by
modem securities law statutes.
We examine in this article specific inefficiencies in French securities laws caused by his-
torical rules aimed at protecting consumers. We analyze French usury rules and the risks
*Eric Cafritz is a partner, and Omer Tene is an associate at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson in
Paris, France.
1. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("A fundamental purpose, common to
[security laws], was to substitute philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."). See also Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641
(C.A. La. 1975); Bank v. Fleisher, 419 F. Supp. 1243 (D.C. Neb. 1976); In re Caesars Palace Securities Liti-
gation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
2. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir. 1973) ("securities laws seek to
prevent restrictions [on flow of information and funds such as would] distort market's estimate of value" that
society places upon efforts of particular enterprise). For capital market efficiency, see RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (5th ed. 1996). For the effect of legal rules on the
efficiency of capital markets, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (efficient market prices accurately
reflect value); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (declining to extend insider trading liability where to do so
would chill efficiency-enhancing activities of market analysis); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Donald C. Langevoort,
Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851 (1992).
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they pose to the development of a French market for high-yield subordinated debt. We
then discuss the rules regulating financial canvassing activities and their effects on recent
French legislative reforms concerning private placements. Finally, we consider protectionist
restrictions on the performance of financial transactions by French investors on foreign
securities markets.
II. Usury
In recent years, lenders and borrowers have used subordinated debt, such as high-yield
bonds, institutional subordinated "mezzanine" financing, participation certificates, and sub-
ordinate trust certificates in an ever-widening variety of transactions, including leveraged
buy-outs, securitizations, and real estate financings. Businesses now commonly utilize
"tiered" capital structures consisting of layers of common and preferred stock, insider or
shareholder debt, mezzanine financing, high-yield bonds, and senior bank or asset-based
debt. While equity has lost some of its appeal as a currency for acquisition transactions,
subordinated debt has gained ground as a cost-efficient financing tool.
The criminal usury statute, which is more stringent in France than in other European
jurisdictions, has substantially curtailed the development of the high-yield bond market in
France. French usury law, which was originally intended to protect individual consumers,
severely restricts the rate of interest that may be paid by a French corporate borrower and
often requires issuers to raise financing outside of France.3 As this article goes to print, the
French Ministry of Finance is trying to push through legislation abolishing French usury
restrictions with respect to corporate borrowers. 4 This legislative reform would harmonize
the French legal regime applicable to high-yield debt with that in London and New York.
As it currently stands, however, article 313-3 of the French Consumer Code states that
"[a] contractual loan constitutes a usurious loan when it is granted at a rate that exceeds, at
the time it is granted, at least one-third of the average effective rate applied during the
prior quarter of the year by credit institutions for loans of the same nature with similar
risks, as defined by the relevant administrative authority after consulting with the National
Credit Council."6 Violation of the usury provision constitutes a criminal offense and sub-
jects the lender to penalties of imprisonment and monetary fines. In addition, the borrower
may refuse to pay the lender interest in excess of the applicable usury rate, regardless of
the terms of the loan agreement.
In a decree issued pursuant to Article 313-3 of the French Consumer Code, the French
Ministry of Finance designated the Bank of France to determine the usury interest rate for
3. Eric Cafritz & Omer Tene, Why French Usury Law Must Change, 21 Nr'L FIN. L. REV. 32-34 (Dec.
2002); Eric Cafritz & Delphine Caramalli, Comment: Are Bonds Subject to French Usury Law, 21 INT'L FIN. L.
REV. 10-12 (Feb. 2002); Delphine Caramalli, La question de /application des rgles relatives h /'usure auxemprunts
obligatoires, 17 LE DALLOZ 1413 (2002).
4. Projet de loi pour linitiative economique (Renvoyi hi une commission speciale en application de 'article 17, alinia
1, du Riglement) (Senate session of Feb. 12, 2003).
5. See Cafritz & Tene, supra note 3; see also Eric Cafritz & Omer Tene, Conflit de lois dans les contrats deprit
internationaux contractis par des entreprisesfranCaises: la question de l'usure, 1 Bull. Joly Bourse 7-16 (an.-Feb.
2003).
6. Usury was prohibited in France in the Law of Jan. 12, 1886, which was amended and replaced by Law
No. 66-1010 of Dec. 28, 1966, and later codified by Law No. 93-349 of July 26, 1993, as article L. 313 etseq.
of the French Consumer Code.
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certain categories of loans specified by executive order.7 The usury rates determined ac-
cording to this provision in France over the past three years have ranged from 7 to 10
percent, well below market rates in the international high-yield market.8 However, the rates
specified by the Bank of France for determination of usury ceilings do not include rates for
corporate loans in an amount greater than 152,449 or loans denominated in foreign cur-
rency.9 The usury rate on such loans would have to be established by the Bank of France
on a case-by-case basis, upon referral by a French court, and by reference to the express
guideline stated on the face of the usury statute, which refers to rates for "loans of the same
nature with similar risks."1
0
A Bank of France official has recently advised us that the Bank of France has never yet
been called upon to determine the usury rate for a loan not covered by the 1990 Decree.
Remarkably, despite the criminal nature of French usury restrictions, there are no published
usury baselines for large scale corporate loans. Parties remain subject to an ex post facto
determination of legality by an administrative agency through a murky and uncharted
procedure.
A highly contentious issue under French law has been whether corporate bonds (obliga-
tions) constitute "contractual loans" (prits conventionnels) within the meaning of the usury
statute. Unlike ordinary loans, bonds in France are governed by a specific set of statutory
provisions and are not solely contractual in nature." In an official statement issued on
January 2, 2003, in response to a formal inquiry submitted by the Senate, the French
Minister of Finance has confirmed that the usury statute does not apply to corporate bonds
issued under the statutory procedures specified in articles 228-38 et seq. of the French
Commercial Code. 2 However, the Minister of Finance declined to address the broader
question of publicly traded high-yield bonds, stating that:
[lit should be noted that this question is distinct from those raised by the public sale of high-
yield bonds. It is up to the relevant market authorities to respond to the questions of investor
protection and information for this segment of the market. 3
7. Decree No. 90-506 ofJune 25, 1990, J.O.,June 26, 1990, p. 7386, as amended by Decree No. 92-1165
of Oct. 26, 1992,J.O., Oct. 27, 1992, p. 14924. The executive order covers "loans with an initial term of more
than two years providing a fixed interest rate; loans with an initial term of more than two years providing a
variable interest rate [and] other loans with an initial term smaller than or equal to two years."
8. The rates are posted and updated on the Bank of France Internet site, at http://www.banque-france.fr
(last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
9. The amount was previously one million French francs. Executive Order (Arr&t6) of June 25, 1990,J.O.,
June 26, 1990, p. 7387, as modified by Executive Order 2001-09-03, J.O., Sept. 11, 2001, p. 14495, applying
Article 2 of Decree No. 90-506 of June 25, 1990.
10. The importance of comparing like loans to like has recently been stressed by the French Minister of
Finance in his official statement discussed infra notes 12-13, 19 and accompanying text. The Minister stated
that "[a] determination of the usury rate cannot be made except by comparison with operations of the same
nature and bearing analogous risks, and the emission of debt instruments is not included in the categories of
loans (... ) for which usury thresholds are set, thereby making it impossible to know beforehand the usury rate
for such issuances."
11. Corporate bonds are negotiable securities (tires ndgociables) that may be listed for trade on a securities
exchange. Only certain types of legal entities (e.g., socidtes par actions) that meet certain statutory requirements
may issue bonds. Bondholders enjoy various statutory rights, such as representation by a formal assembly (masse
des obligataires).
12. Rep. Min. No. 1827, J.O. Senate Q, Jan. 2, 2003 ("an issuance of corporate bonds does not constitute
a 'contractual loan' within the meaning of article 313-3 of the Consumer Code..
13. Id.
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For its part, the French Stock Exchange Commission (Commission des Operations de Bourse)
(COB), which is the "relevant market authority" in the field of publicly traded bonds has
acknowledged in an official published statement that
[t]he usury law is part of a code that is aimed at consumers. So viewed in that specific context
it is a protection for consumers... When that law was put in the Consumer Code the first
action was to say that it was not applicable to bonds because there is no consumer to protect.'
4
However, the COB went on to state that
when we went back to the original law the definition was much larger than in the Consumer
Code and after discussing the interest aspects with the Bank of France it was considered that
for bonds based on French law.., they have to respect the usury limit .... The COB is not
very much in favor of junk bonds. Usury law is a useful method of preventing dangerous
products from flourishing.
Without any intentional irony, the COB concluded that "[w]e have an open market where
everyone can participate so we are not in favor of that kind of product."' 5
The COB does not distinguish between corporate and consumer borrowers, and even
implies that it favors using usury law to protect lenders (i.e., buyers of corporate bonds) in
loan transactions. Yet use of usury law to protect lender-investors from "dangerous prod-
ucts" plainly contradicts not only the thrust of the usury statute, which imposes penalties
of fines or imprisonment on usurious lenders, 6 but also the clear language of the Cour de
cassation (French supreme court), which has held that the usury statute "was enacted in the
sole interest of the borrower."' 7
A leading French doctrinal author acknowledges the logical difficulty of applying usury
law to corporate debt offerings, arguing that
the legislative intent of usury laws is thwarted in these circumstances. In public offerings of
debt, the traditional roles of lender and borrower are completely inverted: it is no longer the
vulnerable borrower who is in need of protection from a greedy, hardened lender that freely
dictates the terms of the contract. Rather it is a naive and overly-confident lender facing a
shrewd, cunning borrower, well rehearsed in the art of financial dazzle.'
This rationale is recapitulated by the Minister of Finance in the official statement of
January 2, 2003 referred to above:
The provisions of article 313-3 are intended to protect the borrower. However, in the case of
the issuance of a debt instrument, the borrower, who is the issuer of the instruments, himself
determines the interest rate and the terms and conditions of the issuance. A protective statutory
regime [governing bond issuances] exists in favor of the lender, that is to say the investor. The
logic is therefore profoundly different. 9
14. T. Williams, The Woman Behind France's Securities Revolution - Interview with COB Legal DirectorFlorence
Roussel, 21 INrT'L FIN. L. REv 3 5, 37 (Mar. 2002). Although usury law has been codified in the French Consumer
Code, the Monetary and Financial Code (MFC) has incorporated by reference the definition of a usurious
interest rate found in article L. 313-3 of the Consumer Code. See article L. 313-5 of the MFC.
15. Id.
16. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
17. Cass. le civ. Feb. 21, 1995, Bull. 1995, I, No. 97, 70.
18. H. Lvy-Ullman, Traiti des obligations h primes et h lots, No. 134; see also Caramalli, supra note 3, at 1414.
19. See supra note 12. Rep. Min. No. 1827,J.O., Senate Q,Jan. 2, 2003.
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To avoid the legal uncertainty of the French usury regime and obtain loans at competitive
international rates, French corporate borrowers have often turned to the banking and fi-
nancial centers in New York and London, where usury law has traditionally been less re-
strictive. An examination of the origins of usury law and its development in England and
the United States2" reveals a path entirely at odds with the course the COB seems to be
taking in France.
The original source of the usury prohibition is the Bible itself." In fact, one U.S. court
has noted that the public policy prohibiting usury is "supported by Divine Authority."22
Yet even the Old Testament did not impose a blanket prohibition on usurious practices:
"[c]ertain scriptures completely prohibit charging interest, deeming it immoral, while oth-
ers permit the charge to foreigners; still others apparently approve of putting money into
a bank to collect interest ... [Tihe Judeo-Christian law of usury is inconsistent."23
One theological commentator observes that
it is obvious that these rules are primarily concerned with the poor. In this, they conform to
the general understanding that Biblical lending laws were basically humanitarian in nature and
were intended to protect the weaker members of the community... Interestingly, because the
rule in [Exodus] applies only to loans to the poor, some commentators have interpreted it to
permit interest on loans made for business purposes.
2 4
In England, usury laws were repealed by Parliament in 1854,5 but due to the proliferation
of loan sharking activities certain credit restrictions were reintroduced by the Money-
Lenders Act of 1900, which set the usury threshold at 48 percent.2 6 The Money-Lenders
Act of 1900 was superseded by sections 137 through 140 of the Consumer Credit Act of
1974 (Credit Act), which permit a court to reopen terms of a credit agreement that it finds
"extortionate" so as "to do justice between the parties."2 7
20. For development of usury law in Europe, see SIDNEY HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES (1963);
BENJAMIN NELSON, THE IDEA OF USURY, FROM TRIBAL BROTHERHOOD TO UNIVERSAL OTHERHOOD (1969).
21. See, e.g., Exodus 22:25 ("If you lend money to My people, to the poor among you, you shall not deal
with them as a creditor; you shall not exact interest from them"); Leviticus 25:35-37 ("If any of your kin fall
into difficulty and become dependent on you, you shall support them .... Do not take interest in advance or
otherwise make a profit from them, but fear your God; let them live with you. You shall not lend them your
money at interest taken in advance, or provide them food at a profit"); Deuteronomy 23:19 ("You shall not
charge interest on loans to another Israelite, interest on money, interest on provisions, interest on anything
that is lent. On loans to a foreigner you may charge interest...).
22. State v. Bynum, 9 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1942). See also Boyd v. Layher, 427 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Mich. 1988)
(citing Leviticus and Deuteronomy in support of the statement that the purpose of usury laws "is to protect the
necessitous borrower from extortion"); Taylor v. Major Fin. Co., 268 So.2d 738, 744 (Ala. 1972) (citingErodus);
Kramer v. McCormick, 474 A.2d 1346, 1346 n.l (Md. 1984) (citing Exodus).
2 3. Paul Golden, Evolution of Corporate Usu-y Laws Has Left Vestigial Statutes that Hinder Business Transactions,
73-MAY N.Y.ST. BJ. 20 (2001).
24. Paul B. Rasor, Biblical Roots of Modern Consumer Credit Law, 10J.L. & RELIGION 157 (1994) (citing DALE
PATRICK, OLD TESTAMENT LAW 86-87 (1985)).
25. Usury Laws Repeal Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 90 (U.K.).
26. An Act to Amend the Law with Respect to Persons Carrying on Business as Money-Lenders, 1900, 63
& 64 Vict. 155, ch. 51.
27. Consumer Credit Act, 1974, §§ 137-40, reprinted in 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES
(4th ed. 1991). The Credit Act implements in the U.K. the requirements of the European Union Council
Directive 87/102/EEC of Dec. 22, 1986, for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit.
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The Credit Act refrains from setting a bright-line usury threshold, defining instead an
extortionate credit agreement as one that "requires the debtor ... to make payments ...
which are grossly exorbitant, or ... otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of
fair dealing."2 Most importantly, the extortionate credit provisions apply only to loans to
individual borrowers, not to corporate borrowing.29
An implicit consideration of bargaining leverage led to the introduction into New York
law of a limitation on usury prohibitions in corporate lending, following the 1850 case of
Dry Dock Bank v. American Life. 0 In Dry Dock Bank, a New York bank succeeded in having
its corporate obligations in the amount of $250,000 declared void on the ground that they
had been given in payment for usurious loans made to the bank. In response to this un-
anticipated use of the usury statute as a shield by a bank-borrower, the New York legislature
enacted a statute providing that "no corporation shall hereafter interpose the defense of
usury in any action."31
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, and Wisconsin subsequently enacted similar statutes.32 The term "defense"
used in these statutes has been held to apply to any position a corporation may take in
seeking to avoid an obligation on the grounds of usury, whether by way of defense or
affirmative action. Hence, a corporation may not recover money it pays in excess of the
legal interest rate, nor may it maintain a suit to procure the cancellation and surrender of
securities for the payment of a usurious loan made to it, or maintain a statutory treble
damage action for usury."
State legislatures crafted the corporate exception to the usury defense in order to prevent
businesses from availing themselves of a statutory provision intended to protect consum-
ers.3 4 Yet, the market for usurious loans adjusted to this legislation and "loan sharks" made
it their policy to loan only to corporations, requiring individual borrowers to incorporate
before being granted an exorbitantly priced loan." The New York State legislature re-
sponded to this practice in 1965 by enacting a section of the New York Law (NYL), which
28. Consumer Credit Act, 1974, § 138(1).
29. Consumer Credit Act, 1974, § 137(2)(a). The term "individual" is defined in section 189(l)of the Credit
Act to include "a partnership or other unincorporated body of persons not consisting entirely of bodies cor-
porate." In a bankruptcy proceeding, however, the court may set aside or modify the provisions of an extor-
tionate credit agreement entered into by a corporate debtor within the three years before it went into liqui-
dation. Section 244 of the Insolvency Act, 1986.
30. Dry Dock Bank v. Am. Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850).
31. Codified in Section 5-521 of the New York General Obligations Law (2002).
32. See generally H. H. Henry, Annotation, Statute Denying Defense of Usury to Corporation, 63 A.L.R.2d 924
(1959).
33. See, e.g., Holland v. Gross, 89 So.2d 255 (Fla. 1956); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Mann, 7 N.W.2d 566
(Iowa 1943); Carozza v. Fed. Fin. & Credit Co., 131 A. 332 (Md. 1925); Pacer/Cats/CCS v. MovieFone, 226
A.D.2d 127 (N.Y. 1996).
34. In some states, the "no usury" statute was worded in reverse, excepting from its coverage those loans
that were not made to consumer-related entities, which, in turn, were defined to exclude corporations. See,
e.g., Betenson v. Call Auto and Equip. Sales, 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982). In other states, the usury statutes state
their consumer protection policy directly in "motive clauses." See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.52.005
(1989) (captioned "Declaration of policy": "(These usury statutes] are enacted in order to protect the residents
of this state from debts bearing burdensome interest rates ... and in recognition of the duty to protect our
citizens from oppression generally.").
35. 1965 N.Y. LEGISITIVE ANNUAL, at 50.
VOL. 37, NO. I
SECURITIES REGULATION V. CONSUMER PROTECTION 179
provides that if a corporation is given a loan at a rate of interest exceeding 25 percent, the
loan is deemed usurious and the lender is subject to criminal sanctions. 6
Consequently, although a corporation is generally prohibited from interposing the de-
fense of usury in an action for debt collection, the prohibition does not apply where the
corporation alleges criminal usury. 7 In a criminal proceeding, however, the claimant bears
a much higher standard of proof to refute the strong presumption against criminal wrong-
doing by the lender.
The provision of NYL § 5-521(3) combined with the criminal offense of usury under
section 190.40 of the New York penal law served to deny businesses access to loans at
interest rates exceeding 2 5 percent, even if funds were required for risky ventures financially
justifying such high costs of capital. This result went beyond the legislative intent, which,
as one court put it, was "to curb certain abuses by persons commonly known as 'loan sharks'
who charged high interest rates but avoided defense of usury by insisting that an individual
borrower organize a corporation which then became the nominal borrower.""
In Schneider v. Phelps3 9 the New York Court of Appeals attempted to strike a balance
between the protection of consumers on one hand, and the financing of risky or financially
leveraged businesses on the other hand. The court explained:
The purpose of usury laws, from time immemorial, has been to protect desperately poor people
from the consequences of their own desperation. Law-making authorities in almost all civili-
zations have recognized that the crush of financial burdens causes people to agree to almost
any conditions of the lender and to consent to even the most improvident loans ... In rec-
ognizing this problem, the courts have drawn a delicate balance by both enforcing legitimate
business obligations and by protecting impoverished debtors from improvident transactions
drawn by lenders and brought on by dire personal financial stress.4
The Schneider court stressed:
[L]enders are entitled, if they can, without sham transactions, to obtain the highest rate of
interest for their money. So long as the borrower is aware of the potential risk and acts in the
belief that the ultimate profit justifies the risk undertaken, the free market in money operates
without friction and there is no need for legislative or judicial interference. If the venture falls
through or if the profits do not reach anticipated levels, the businessman will not be relieved
36. N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAW § 5-521 (2001), which currently provides:
1. No corporation shall hereafter interpose the defense of usury in any action. The term corporation,
as used in this section, shall be construed to include all associations, and joint-stock companies having
any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships ....
3. The provisions of subdivision one of this section shall not apply to any action in which a corporation
interposes a defense of criminal usury as described in section 190.40 of the penal law.
Section 190.40 of the New York penal law provides (under the title "Criminal usury in the second degree"):
A person is guilty of criminal usury in the second degree when, not being authorized or permitted by
law to do so, he knowingly charges, takes or receives any money or other property as interest on the
loan or forbearance of any money or other property, at a rate exceeding twenty-five per centum per
annum or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period.
37. Transmedia Rest. Co. v. 33 E. 61st Street Rest. Corp., 710 N.Y.S.2d 756 (2000).
38. Reisman v. William Hartmann & Son, Inc., 273 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1966).
39. Schneider v. Phelps, 359 N.E.2d 1361 (N.Y. 1977).
40. Id. at 1365.
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from the consequences of his bad bargain, just as the courts will not relieve a promisor from
the obligations of an improvident contract.
4
'
NYL § 5-501(6), which exempts loans in an amount greater than $2,500,000 from the
scope of usury laws, made a clear distinction between consumer and business lending in
New York41 Such a bright-line rule facilitates large commercial loans and permits busi-
nesses, whether organized as corporations or other legal entities, to obtain loans with in-
terest costs that are commensurate with the risk of their assets.
43
To modernize French debt markets, without undermining the legislative purpose of the
usury statute, France needs to establish clear boundaries to limit the applicability of usury
laws to the sphere of consumer lending and "loan sharking" activities. The reform proposal
currently under review by the French Senate, which would exempt from the usury statute
loans to corporate borrowers, would bring French usury rules into harmony with those in
New York and London.
m. Canvassing Rules and Private Placements
A. DgMARCHAGE
French financial dfnarcbage rules restrict the canvassing of securities. The rules pro-
hibit the solicitation of investors except by those financial institutions specifically licensed
to conduct canvassing activities and that have filed a formal prospectus for the proposed
investment with the securities exchange authorities. 4 Dbnarchage rules are consumer
protection rules intended to protect vulnerable consumers from unfair bargaining pres-
sure.
4 s Yet, as in the case of the usury rules discussed above, dbnarchage rules hamper
legitimate investment transactions in situations where the targeted investors do not re-
quire the protection offered by the rules. In fact, as discussed below, dimarchage rules
contradict the private placement exemption adopted in France in 1998 to permit the
offering of securities without a prospectus to eligible investors. The draft legislation
currently under review by the French Senate (Draft Legislation)46 to reform dimarcbage
rules only partially resolves contradictions between private placement and dimarchage
rules and, unfortunately, creates new ones.
Doctrinal authors warned that dfnarcbage statutes are liable to become "part of the phe-
nomenon of criminal laws that are rarely enforced; laws that define only in vague terms the
nature of the prohibition, so as to include many activities that are not socially reprehensible,
and that enforcement of which would paralyze a significant volume of legitimate business
transactions. '' 47 In legislative debates concerning proposed amendments of the dinarchage
rules, the speaker of the French parliament recently declared that d~marchage provisions
41. Id.
42. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6)(b) (2001). See also § 5-501(6)(a), which provides that loans in an
amount greater than $250,000, other than loans secured by residential mortgages, are exempt from usury laws,
except for criminal usury restrictions.
43. See, e.g., Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group, 919 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990); Machidera v. Toms, 685
N.Y.S.2d 719 (1999).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 66-76.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
46. Projet de loi de scuritefinanciere (commission des finances, du contrlle budgitaire et des comptes iconomiques de
la nation) (Senate session of Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.senat.fr/leg (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
47. A. Ronzano, Offre publique d'acbat d'actions non coties: Epbemnre consecration on rialiti durable? RDBB,
Jan-Feb. 1993, at 37, nn.35-36.
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were "imposed by an old text that did not take into consideration modern commercial
techniques," 4 and other members of the French parliament criticized the rules as "complex,
imprecise and incomplete." 49
Regulators and legislators alike have characterized the dbnarcbage statutes as consumer
protection laws. s0 The statutes date from as early as 188511 and were expanded in the 1970s
as part of a wave of consumer protection legislation, which included Law No. 72-1137 of
December 22, 1972 concerning the protection of consumers from dbnarchage operations
and door-to-door sales, and Law No. 73-1193 of December 27, 1973 concerning false or
misleading advertising.52 The stated purpose of these statutes, which are not restricted in
scope to financial products, is "to prevent abuse of consumers' weakness or ignorance by
means of visiting their homes and causing them to enter into cash or credit agreements." 3
Alongside the general dbnarcbage laws,14 specific statutes have been enacted "bit by bit,
product by product"" to regulate dnarchage activities in financial markets, particularly
those pertaining to stocks,56 bonds, 7 futures contracts,58 interests in mutual funds,59 and
real estate transactions. 60 The provisions of Law No. 72-6 ofJanuary 3, 1972, which restrict
the canvassing of equity securities, were codified in December 2000 as articles 342-1
through 342-21 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (MFC).6' Article 342-2 of the
MFC defines dbnarcbage broadly as visiting persons at their homes or places of work on a
habitual basis62 for the purpose of recommending or encouraging the subscription, pur-
chase, exchange, or sale of securities; 6r participating in transactions involving securities or
providing such recommendations or encouragement to the general public. 63 Sending letters,
48. Prjet de loi portant diverses dispositions d'ordre iconomique et financier pour lanne 2001 (commission des
Finances, du contr6le budg~taire et des comptes 6conomiques de la Nation), Senate session of May 30, 2001,
available at http://www.senat.fr/Ieg (last visited Jan. 23, 2003) [hereinafter 2001 Draft).
49. Id.
50. 2001 Draft, supra note 48; Rapport COB, 1992, at 62.
51. Law of Mar. 28, 1885,J.O., Apr. 8, 1885, p. 1849.
52. Law No. 72-1137 of Dec. 22, 1972,J.O., Dec. 23, 1972, p. 13348;JCP 1973, HI, 39950; Law No. 73-
1193 of Dec. 27, 1973, J.O., Dec. 30, 1973, p. 14139; JCP 1974, 1m, 41167. For the legislative history of
demarchage laws generally, see L. Lefevre, Dimarchage financier: limites et lacunes du cadre juridique face aux
pratiques de la commercialisation des produits et services financiers, 32 Droit Financiers et Boursier 13 (Nov.-Dec.
1993).
53. Lef'evre, supra note 52, at 14.
54. See article 8 of Law No. 72-1137 of Dec. 22, 1972 excluding from the scope of the statute demarchage
activities that are covered by specific legislation.
55. Lefevre, supra note 52, at 14.
56. See Law No. 72-6 of Jan. 3, 1972,J.0.,Jan.5, 1972, p. 154;JCP 1972, , 38610.
57. See Law No. 66-1010 of Dec. 28, 1966, J.O., Dec. 29, 1966, p. 11623;JCP 1967, 111, 32587.
58. Law of Mar. 28, 1885, J.0., Apr. 8, 1885, p. 1849, as modified and amended in 1985.
59. Law No. 88-1201 of Dec. 23, 1988,J.O., Dec. 31, 1988, p. 16736;JCP 1989, III, 62262.
60. Law No. 70-1300 of Dec. 31, 1970, J.O., Jan. 1, 1971, p. 9;JCP 1971, I1, 37344.
61. Ordinance No. 2000-1223 of Dec. 14, 2000, J.0., Dec. 16, 2000, p. 20004.
62. French courts have interpreted the concept of dinarchage widely, deeming the visiting or contacting
of more than one person as "habitual" marketing activities. See Dictionnaire permanent, Opargne et produitsfi-
nanciers, tude: demarchage financiers, feuilles 68, Jan. 20, 2001, at 292, para. 9. For a wide reading of the term
"habitual" under French law see, e.g., Cass. Crim., Mar. 24, 1944, D. 1944, 75; Cass. Crim., July 9, 1948, D.
1948, 410. See also Cass. Crim., Dec. 14, 1981, D. 1982, 174 (defendant conducted dimarchage "habitually"
even though engaged in marketing activities for only one project); T.G.I. St. Nazaire, Jan. 20, 1981, D.1981,
354 (company conducted dimarchage "habitually" where it employed an agent whose task was to conduct
canvassing operations).
63. MFC art. L. 342-2.
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circulars or other marketing material, and making telephone calls to customers for such
purposes are included within the definition of d6marchage, whether these activities are car-
ried out in France or from abroad. 64 The distribution of investment research for marketing
purposes and the solicitation of customers to engage in institutional brokerage activities,
including during a roadshow, would also be considered dimarcbage under the MFC.6 1
Under the MFC, only four kinds of entities may carry out canvassing activities in France:
(1) French investment services providers specifically authorized for dfnarcbage by the Conseil
des marcbis (CMF) or the COB; (2) French credit institutions so authorized by the Comiti
des itablissements de cridit et des entreprises d'Investissements (CECEI); (3) French insurance
companies; or (4) equivalent entities in EU Member States that benefit from the EU single
passport regime (that is, those approved to conduct demarcbage activities in their home
states).6 Authorized financial institutions must in turn certify specific personnel for denar-
chage activities by issuing to them an "employment card" (carte d'emplot).67
The thrust of these provisions is to permit only licensed financial intermediaries to pro-
mote investment products. Doctrinal authors emphasize that "the law was intended to
protect savers against wrongdoings by inexperienced financial intermediaries. ' 61 A leading
French commentator notes that "these principles have effectively guaranteed the monopoly
of registered financial intermediaries and their personnel over the distribution of financial
products .... They are embodied in the administrative requirement for the issuance of a
carte d'emploi to an authorized agent." 69 Through verbal discussions with the regulating
authorities, however, we have ascertained that there is no central registry or administrative
procedure for licensing entities to conduct d6narchage activities. The law is apparently not
enforced and dbnarcbage authorization is not required for investment services providers as
long as they are authorized to operate in France and have declared their intent to conduct
denarcbage activities to the COB.70
To conduct a placement of securities in France,7 a financial intermediary must be
an authorized French "investment services provider" (prestataire de services d'investisse-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. MFC art. L. 342-3, implemented by Decree No. 72-781 of Aug. 22, 1972 art. 1-2,J.O., Aug. 27, 1972,
p. 92 31 ;JCP 1972, m11, 39508 ('72 Decree), amended by Decree No. 84-1152 of Dec. 21, 1984 art. 2,J.O., Dec.
22, 1984, p. 3945;JCP 1985, 111, 56514, amended by Decree No. 85-371 of Mar. 27, 1985 art. 2,J.O., Mar. 29,
1985, p. 3655; JCP 1985, III, 57031. A significant revision proposed in the Draft Legislation would allow a
company to canvass its employees as part of a profit sharing or employee savings plan of a type authorized by
the French Labor Code. Article L.341-3(2) of the Draft Legislation. See discussion, infra notes 96-102 and
accompanying text.
67. MFC art. L. 342-7.
68. C. Ferry, Prises departicipation et rapprochements d'entreprises,JCP 6d. E., 1994, 1, 335, n.10.
69. Lefevre, supra note 52, at 14.
70. These practices are likely to change if the Draft Legislation is adopted. The Draft Legislation provides
detailed procedures for demarchage, including the maintenance of professional insurance (Article L.341-5 of
the Draft Legislation); registration of persons authorized to perform dimarcbage activities with market regu-
lators (Article L.341-6 of the Draft Legislation); and issuance of a personal dbnarcbage card (Article L.341-8
of the Draft Legislation).
71. The term "placement" is defined broadly in the General Regulations of the Conseil des Marchbs Fi-
nanciers (hereinafter CMF). See CMF, General Regulations art. 2-1-6 [hereinafter General Regulations], avail-
able at http://www.cmf-finance.org/docshtmlreglt/regltgen/RGACMFIl.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003). "An
investment service provider conducts the business of placing where it seeks subscribers or purchasers on behalf
of the issuer or of a seller of financial instruments." Id.
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ment),7" or an equivalent entity in a EU member state that benefits from the EU single
passport regime." To become a French investment services provider, one must secure the
approval of the CECEI under article 531-1 of the MFC.7 4 Hence, a U.S. issuer intending




An entity authorized to conduct dimarchage must, in each case, file with the COB a "note
d'information," which is a prospectus setting forth detailed information regarding the se-
curities offered. Decree No. 72-781 of August 22, 1972 ('72 Decree) refers to the approval
formalities and requirements pertaining to the note d'information. Yet article 6(1) of the '72
Decree incorporates by reference the prospectus requirements contained in the more gen-
eral public offering provisions of the MFC. 76 Hence, the prospectus required by the di-
marchage rules is the same as the prospectus required for a public offering of securities.
The '72 Decree clearly did not contemplate the possibility of dimarchage activities outside
of a public offering of securities. In fact, the concept of a private placement exemption
would not be introduced into French law for another twenty-six years. 7
B. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
Not all investors fit the mold of the weak or ignorant customers whom the dimarchage
rules are intended to protect from importunate or incompetent salespersons. In 1998, the
French legislature enacted a private placement exemption from public offering rules to
facilitate the offering of securities to sophisticated financial institutions or corporate insiders
and their friends and relatives. The theory, now widely accepted throughout Europe and
in the United States, was that such investors are in a position to assess the risks of investment
without a formal prospectus. By legislative accident or oversight, however, the dimarchage
rules continue to apply to private placements, in apparent contradiction with the exemption.
Under French law, a public offering (Appelpublic h l'pargne) is defined as: (1) the listing
of securities for trade on a regulated market;78 or (2) the issuance or sale of securities to the
public by way of advertising, canvassing, or use of a financial intermediary. 9 Every issuer
that makes a public offering of securities in France, whether equity or debt, must file a
prospectus with the COB. 0 The COB reviews the prospectus for basic compliance with
72. See MFC art. L. 32 1-1, stating that a placement is an "investment service." See also General Regulations,
supra note 71, art. 2-1-1(I)(1)(d).
73. General Regulations, supra note 71, arts. 2-3-1 to 4.
74. Law No. 96-597, July 2, 1996, J.O., July 4, 1996, p. 100063.
75. U.S. financial intermediaries may argue that a private placement within the statutory exemption does
not constitute a "placement," and is therefore not an "investment service" under article L. 321-1 of the MFC,
the provision of which is restricted to authorized investment services providers. Article L. 531-1 of the MFC.
This interpretation is contrary to the view expressed to us verbally by the COB.
76. Article 6(1) refers to "the document provided for under Articles 6 and 7 of Ordinance No. 67-833 of
March 23, 1967," which is the prospectus now governed by article L. 412-1 of the MFC.
77. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
78. Issuers may list securities either on the official list of the Paris Bourse, which includes the First and
Second Markets, or on the New Stock Market (Nouveau Marche), option market or derivatives market.
79. MFC article L. 411-1. Note that under article 57 of Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, publication
of information that is required by law or regulation does not constitute, in and of itself, a public offering.
Decree No. 67-236, Mar. 23, 1967, J.O., Mar. 24, 1967, p. 2843.
80. MFC article L. 412-1.
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statutory content rules and then issues a visa authorizing the public distribution of the
prospectus."' The prospectus and other offering documents may, in limited circumstances,
be in English as long as they are accompanied by a summary (rsum) in French. 2
COB Regulation No. 98-01 specifies the formalities for the submission of a prospectus.
In broad summary, the prospectus must contain all information necessary for an investor
to make an informed decision concerning the value, the business activity, and the financial
situation and results of operations of the issuer, including management's outlook for the
future, and the rights that attach to the securities. The prospectus must be made generally
available to the public and transmitted to any person solicited in the offering.
Failure to comply with offering formalities constitutes a violation of the general "obli-
gation to inform the public" under COB Regulation No. 98-07. Such a violation may
subject issuers to a fine in an amount up to 1.77 million euros or, if the issuer profits from
the violation, in an amount up to ten times the total profit.
Prior to 1998, there was no private placement exception to the French prospectus re-
quirements. In 1998, France implemented the European Union Common Prospective Di-
rective,83 which recognizes a private placement exemption for the issuance or sale of se-
curities to "qualified investors" or a "restricted group of investors," acting in each case for
their own account.84
81. A visa from the COB is required for initial listings on the primary or secondary market. However, if the
securities are to be listed on the secondary market and are not publicly offered, the prospectus does not require
formal COB approval.
82. The submission of an English prospectus accompanied by a rsumi in French was standard practice in
France until a Conseil d'Etat (supreme administrative court) decision of Nov. 20, 2000, which determined that
all offering documents must be in French (applying Law No. 94-665 of Aug. 4, 1994). In accordance with the
court decision, the COB amended its instructions to require the submission of documents strictly in French.
The French legislature has recently relaxed this requirement, enacting article 27 of Law No. 2001-1168 of
Dec. 11, 2001, which allows for the submission of a prospectus "in a language customary for financial matters"
to be accompanied by a French rsumi, in circumstances defined by COB regulation. Although the law had
been ruled constitutional by the Conseil Constitutionnel (Case 2001-452 DC, Dec. 6, 2001), the COB has recently
implemented an exceedingly narrow interpretation of the legislative change in COB Regulation No. 2002-03
of Apr. 6, 2002. Under this regulation, a foreign language prospectus accompanied by a French risumm may be
submitted only in the following cases: (i) the issuance in France (or listing on a French market) of securities
listed for trading on another EU market, no more than three months after the submission of the prospectus
with respect to such listing in the other jurisdiction; (ii) the issuance of securities by a foreign company to its
employees in France; or (iii) the listing for trading on the primary market of debt securities that have been
previously issued in France without a public offering.
83. Council Directive 89/298/EEC of Apr. 17, 1989 (Prospectus Directive); see generally Marc I. Steinberg
& Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis ofJurisdictionalApproaces, Commonality and
Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (1999); Eddy Wymeersch, The EU Directives on Financial Disclosures, EUR.
FIN. SERV. L. (Feb. 1996), at 34. According to the Prospectus Directive, EUMember States can choose whether
or not to exclude certain security offerings from the requirement to prepare and publish a prospectus. These
include the issuance of (i) securities offered exclusively to professionals; (ii) securities with a high face value or
high minimum subscription price (40,000 euros or more), which are presumed to be of no interest to retail
investors; or (iii) securities offered to a "restricted group of persons." A member state may be stricter than the
Prospectus Directive and allow fewer exceptions than the EU rule. France, for example, does not recognize a
"high face value" exception, and requires that investors in a private placement act solely for their own account.
84. Law No. 98-546, July 2, 1998, J.O., July 3, 1985, p. 10127, which modified article 6 of the Ordinance
of Sept. 28, 1967, and is codified in article L. 411-2 of the MFC. The exemption is phrased as a derogation
from the public offering definition in article L. 411-1. Hence, if the requirements of the exemption are met,
the issuance of securities does not constitute a public offering.
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"Qualified investors" are defined in article 411-2 as legal entities (not individuals) that
possess the necessary competence and means to appreciate the risks of transactions in
financial instruments. French mutual funds (organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mob-
iliires) are explicitly deemed qualified investors. Decree No. 98-880 of October 1, 1998
('98 Decree) sets out various other categories of qualified investors, including: (1) French
banks and finance companies, investment firms, insurance and reinsurance companies, cer-
tain state institutions such as the Bank of France, and social security funds;8 5 and (2) large
companies with total stand-alone or consolidated balance sheet assets in excess of 150 mil-
lion euros, as well as venture capital firms, quasi-public companies, 6 and companies wholly
owned by other qualified investors that in each case have published an election to be con-
sidered "qualified investors" in an official French legal journal.
A "restricted group of investors" is defined in article 411-2 as a group of entities and
individuals related to managers of the issuer by "personal relations, of a professional or
family nature." The '98 Decree adds an evidentiary presumption according to which any
group of less than 100 persons is considered a "restricted group." An offer of securities to
more than 100 investors may still qualify for the private placement exemption if the issuer
can prove that he is related to each of the prospective investors.8 7
A contentious issue under the law has been whether managers' relations with employees,
as such, can be considered "personal relations of a professional nature," qualifying an is-
suance to employees of shares of the employing company as a private placement. The COB's
position has been that labor relationships per se do not constitute "personal relations";
rather, consideration must be given to the employees' seniority and their actual personal
contacts with management. The practical effect of the COB's view may be that employers
cannot offer shares generally to employees under the private placement exemption.
We believe that a more plausible reading of the phrase would qualify a professional or
family relation per se as a "personal relation" under Article 411-2. The distinction between
"personal" and "impersonal" employer-employee relations seems to us a difficult one for
security regulators to make. Must the issuing company's chief executive officer have dined
together with the investor-employee, perhaps on a regular basis, or will the employee's
business lunch with the chief financial officer suffice? In the case of family relations, the
same syntactical reading of the adjective "personal" in Article 411-2 would lead to a cri-
terion that there be "personal relations of a family nature" between the issuer and the
offeree. How often must one have visited one's uncle in order to offer securities to him
without a prospectus?88
The "issuer for his own account" requirement is applicable to each of the two types of
investors qualifying for the private placement exemption. Neither law nor regulation defines
85. In addition to these categories of investors, French investment funds (some of which are not legal entities)
and their management companies (sociftds de gestion) are expressly deemed to be qualified investors. Article 1 (III)
of the '98 Decree.
86. These are industrial or commercial concerns, wholly or partly owned by the state, the shares of which
are quoted on a European Economic Area regulated market.
87. Under article 2 of COB Regulation No. 98-09 of Mar. 2, 1999, pertaining to the formalities required
for a private placement, the issuer must, in case of an offering to a "restricted group" of more than 100 investors,
obtain from each investor a statement attesting to the existence of a "personal relationship of a professional or
family nature" between it and such investors.
88. For doctrinal discussion challenging the position of the COB, see, e.g., H. VAUPLANE, DRoiT DES MtRCHiS
FINANCIERS, 381 nn. 373-1 (Litec, 2001).
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the concept.8 9 It raises such questions as whether securities issued in a private placement must
be held for a minimum period of time by the purchasers; whether the transferability of such
securities must be restricted; whether a financial institution buying securities for a client's
account loses its eligibility for the exemption; and whether "qualified investors" may avail
themselves of the exemption if they act on behalf of other "qualified investors" (or members
of a "restricted group"). French case law does not provide clear answers to these questions.
The COB has indicated only that purchasers of securities issued in a private placementshould
hold the securities for a "minimum time period" prior to their transfer. °
C. D9MARCHAGE RULES CONTRADICT THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT EXEMPTION
The COB continues to enforce dbnarchage rules in securities markets even after the
enactment of the private placement exemption. In fact, if only in theory, it may do so in
circumstances falling squarely within the exemption, thereby defeating the legislative pur-
pose of the exemption.
The very purpose of the private placement exemption is to permit the offering of secu-
rities to eligible investors without a prospectus. This is in flat contradiction with the d-
marchage rules, which still require a prospectus for any securities offered for sale. The
d~narcbage rules were not amended to allow for the private placement exemption. A textual
reading of the dznarcbage rule itself (article 6(1) of the '72 Decree) leads to a contradiction
on the face of the statute: the prospectus required under article 6(1) of the '72 Decree in a
canvassing of securities is determined by cross-reference to article 412-1 of the MFC, which
states the requirements for a prospectus in a public offer. Yet a qualified private placement
is by definition not a public offer and hence does not require a prospectus, so in the case of
a private placement, the cross-reference in article 6(1) of the '72 Decree points to a void.
Regulators may argue that when canvassing by a financial intermediary occurs, an offering
of securities should be deemed "public" and therefore subject to prospectus requirements.
Certain doctrinal authors have advocated this approach, claiming that dbnarchage activities
by financial intermediaries raise an evidentiary presumption that a public offering has taken
place. 9' However, this view is at odds with the express opinion of the COB. In its 1998 Annual
Report, the COB writes that offerors may qualify for the private placement exemption even
if their securities are placed by financial intermediaries, as opposed to by the issuer directly.92
The emergence of new media channels, such as the Internet, e-mail, and facsimile, has
prompted regulators to seek a more precise definition of ddnarchage activities. Nevertheless,
the definition of demarchage included in the Draft Legislation currently under review
by the French Senate remains broad and in conflict with the private placement exemption. 9'
The Draft Legislation does, however, lend partial support to the position stated recently
by the COB that the COB does not consider a solicitation of investors conducted within
the scope of the private placement exemption to be subject to d6marchage rules.- Under
89. For limitations on resale of unregistered securities in the United States, see SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (2001).
90. COB Bulletin, July-Aug. 1998, at 10; see also VAUPLANE, supra note 88, at 376; cf. SEC Rule 144(d), 17
C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (2001).
91. Bruno Oppetit et al., Placement prive et appepubic i lhpargne, REVUE DE DRbIT BANCAIRE T DE LA BoURSE
(May-June 1992), at 91 n.31.
92. Commission des Operations de Bourse, Annual Report (1998).
93. Articles L. 341-1 and 341-2 of the Draft Legislation, supra note 46.
94. Telephone interview with the legal department of the COB (Feb. 28, 2002).
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the Draft Legislation, dbnarchage provisions would not apply to any contact with "qualified
investors."9
Yet, even if the Draft Legislation is enacted into law, other private placements targeting
a "restricted group" of investors will remain subject to d~marchage rules. The Draft Leg-
islation takes a piecemeal approach: instead of exempting from demarcbage prohibitions any
placement to a "restricted group" under Article 411-2 of the MFC, the Draft Legislation
exempts only placements by companies to their employees under Title IV of Book IV of
the French Labor Code (Tide IV). 96
Tide IV establishes three types of profit sharing plans for employees:97 (1) intiressement,
under which companies distribute cash bonuses to employees;98 (2) participation, under
which companies reserve a portion of earnings on behalf of employees in cash or stock
accounts that are blocked for a period of five years; 99 and (3)plan d'pargne d'entreprise (PEE),
under which companies and employees make tax advantaged contributions to reserved share
accounts holding stock of the employing company or interests in a mutual fund. °° Under
Title IV, a corporate group is considered to be a single economic unit, thereby permitting
a parent company to distribute shares to employees of a subsidiary. 1 1 Tide IV does not
distinguish between French and foreign-owned businesses. Hence, foreign companies op-
erating in France through a subsidiary or an unincorporated branch may, or, in the case of
participation in a company employing more than fifty employees, must, manage Title IV
plans on behalf of their employees. 102
However, although the Draft Legislation exempts the distribution of securities in a qual-
ified Tide V plan, it does not address the issue of reserved employee share programs that
are not governed by Tide IV, such as the common transaction in which a company offers
shares or stock options to a limited group of senior executives. Nor does it address place-
ments to a "restricted group" of personal or professional acquaintances who are not nec-
essarily employed by the issuer, as permitted under Article 2 COB Regulation No. 98-09. 103
95. Article L. 341-2(1) of the Draft Legislation. The current version of the Draft Legislation extends the
exemption of "qualified investors" to include "commercial companies whose total assets, turnover, or work-
force, exceeds the threshold set by ministerial decree." (Cf. The 2001 Draft, Article L. 341-2(1). This addition
is superfluous and confusing, since large companies are already included in the term "qualified investors" under
Article 411-2 of the MFC, as implemented by the '98 Decree. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
In fact, if large companies are defined differently in the decree to be issued under Article L. 341-2(1) of the
Draft Legislation than in the '98 Decree, an additional discord will be created between large companies under
the private placement regulations and large companies under the dbnarcbage regulations.
96. Article 341-3(2) of the Draft Legislation, which was not part of the 2001 Draft, exempts from dSmar-
cbage r gulation "businesses canvassing their employees under Title IV of Book IV of the Labor Code."
97. Ordinance No. 86-1134 of 21 Oct. 1986 art. 33,J.O., 23 Oct. 1986, p. 12771; Law No. 2001-152 of
19 Feb. 2001 art. 1, J.O., 20 Feb. 2001, p. 2774; JCP E, 29 Mar. 2001, p. 552; codified as C.TRAV. Art. 441-
1 et seq.
98. C.TRAV. Art. 441-1 to 441-7.
99. C.TRAV. Art. 442-1 to 442-14. Companies employing more than 50 employees are obligated to
provide a participation plan. The plan must benefit all employees in proportion to their wages. It may be
conditioned on seniority, but of a period no longer than three months.
100. C.TRAV. Art. 443-1 to 443-9. A PEE is voluntarily established by a company and may be restricted
to employees with determined seniority.
101. C.TRAV. Art. 444-3.
102. Documentation pratique Francis Lefebvre, Social, PB I, n* 1400 et seq.; see also Rep. Cantegrit, Senate
Session 3 Dec. 1987, p. 1900, no. 4371.
103. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. In fact, the Title IV exemption creates yet another contra-
diction with the private placement exemption: Under article 341-3(2) of the Draft Legislation, a company
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Furthermore, the Draft Legislation prohibits the canvassing in France of "products that
are not admitted for trade on a French regulated market or on a foreign market recognized
pursuant to articles 422-1 and. 423-1 of the MFC."' 0 The recognition of foreign securities
markets is regulated by Decree No. 90-948 of October 25, 1990 ('90 Decree).55 The '90
Decree empowers the Ministry of Finance, upon recommendation by the COB, to deter-
mine the approved foreign securities markets. The current list, issued on October 10,
2001,106 includes mainly commodities and derivatives markets, such as the Chicago Board
of Trade, the Amex, and the New York Futures Exchange. Two financial markets conspic-
uously absent from the list are the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.
Hence, the d6marchage provisions of the Draft Legislation would override the private
placement exemption in the case of U.S. companies whose securities are traded on the two
leading U.S. securities exchanges. Such companies would be able to privately place their
securities in France only under the "qualified investor" branch of the private placement
exemption, or pursuant to share programs qualified under Title IV. The Draft Legislation
would thus further restrict one of the largest potential fields of private placement activity.
As it stands, even when a security offering clears the public offering hurdle, the marketing
of the securities remains subject to the dimarchage rules and, in particular, to the formalities
and requirements pertaining to the note d'information. To complete the reform of public
offering and demarchage laws, France needs to clearly exempt private placements from can-
vassing restrictions.
IV. Transactions on a Foreign Securities Market
Financial intermediaries placing or canvassing foreign securities in France must also take
care not to violate the provisions of the law of March 28, 1885 (1885 Law), which have
now been re-codified in articles 422-1 and 423-1 of the MFC. °s Under the 1885 Law,
investors in France may not be solicited for financial transactions performed on a foreign
securities market that has not been specifically "recognized" by French authorities.
As discussed above, 1°8 the current list of approved foreign securities markets, does not
include the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. Hence, under current regula-
tions, investors in France may not be solicited to perform financial transactions on the two
leading U.S. securities exchanges? °9
would be permitted to canvass employees without a prospectus if its plan qualifies under Tide IV, which, in
turn, requires that the plan benefit all employees, with a seniority of at least three months. In contrast, the
COB interprets the private placement exemption to permit an issuance without a prospectus only to a restricted
group of employees whose seniority and actual contacts with management qualify as "personal relations" under
article 411-2 of the MFC. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Thus, a placement exempt from
prospectus requirements under article 341-3(2) of the Draft Legislation would be subject to prospectus re-
quirements under article 411 -1 of the MFC; conversely, a placement exempt from prospectus requirements
under article 411-2 of the MFC would be subject to prospectus requirements under the demarchage rules.
104. Article 341-10 of the Draft Legislation.
105. Decree No. 90-948 of Oct. 25, 1990,J.O., Oct. 27, 1990, p. 13026.
106. Order of the Ministry of Finance of Oct. 10, 2001.
107. Law of Mar. 28, 1885,J.O., Apr. 8, 1885, p. 1849.
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
109. In our view, this rule does not restrict French investors from investing abroad but rather curtails
activities targeted at the marketing in France of such foreign investments. The COB has indicated that com-
panies may solicit investors in France to invest in their own shares, which may be traded on the NYSE, the
NASDAQ, or another "unrecognized" exchange.
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The location of the performance of the transaction provides the critical distinction be-
tween the blanket restriction of the '90 Decree and the conditional exemptions applying to
private placements and foreign issuances in France.110 Even if a placement passes all other
regulatory barriers, promoters must be certain that the performance of the underlying
transaction does not occur on an unrecognized market. In the case of securities traded on
the NYSE, for example, the securities must be sold in France through a French bank or an
authorized financial intermediary."'
In today's global financial market, cross-border transactions are performed on computer
screens and transmitted instantaneously among main "data hubs" located in financial centers
such as New York, London, or Hong Kong, to a network of computers spanning the world.
The location where a financial transaction occurs is no longer a meaningful basis for re-
strictive regulation. Protectionist statutes that require excessive layers of financial inter-
mediation unnecessarily inflate transaction costs and ultimately harm the constituency they
seek to protect - retail investors.
V. Conclusion
Anglo-American common law reflects a belief that free markets are more efficient than
state-controlled markets. The assumption is that as long as market participants have access
to all requisite information, efficient transactions will occur. The government need not
intervene except where the flow of information is obstructed, such as in cases of fraud or
the agglomeration of market power.
French law reflects an entirely different principle, that of dirigis-me, under which the
government directs the market. Through restrictions or the outright prohibition of certain
transactions, often enforced by criminal sanctions, the government intervenes to protect
parties perceived as vulnerable from exploitation by others in a stronger bargaining position.
Without taking sides in the trans-Atlantic controversy-a debate sharpened by recent
accounting scandals in the United States and France-we maintain that when French reg-
ulators choose to intervene in securities markets, they should carefully select their rules of
engagement. Consumer protection laws are not well adapted to the modern securities arena,
where financially astute investors and institutions interact.
Usury law is poorly tailored to regulate high-yield debt markets and its effect in France
has been to place French companies at a disadvantage vis-k-vis foreign competitors in the
110. The Draft Legislation would strictly prohibit the canvassing of securities traded on an "unrecognized"
exchange, regardless of the location of the performance of the transaction. See discussion, rupra notes 104-06
and accompanying text.
I 11. Foreign financial intermediaries must also be authorized in France pursuant to article 3 of the '90
Decree. Article 3 provides that such entity must be approved to act as a financial intermediary by the competent
regulatory authority in its home country, and that the controlling French authority must be satisfied that the
rules and regulations applying to the competence, integrity and solvency of such intermediary in its home
country are commensurate with those applicable in France. COB Regulation No. 99-04 (as modified by Regu-
lation 2000-08) lists the procedural requirements for the marketing in France of financial products traded on
a recognized foreign exchange or a regulated European market. This regulation determines that any advertising
or information circulated by a foreign financial intermediary in France, with a view to a transaction on a
recognized foreign exchange, must contain certain details with respect to the foreign securities market and the
financial intermediary.
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search for financing. Demarchage rules are manifestly inappropriate in the case of a qualified
private placement, where by statutory definition the targeted investor is not vulnerable to
undue bargaining pressure. A 1885 law that protects French investors from solicitation for
foreign transactions imposes unwarranted costs and an additional layer of intermediation
on the very investors that it seeks to protect.
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